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Misconduct: Must Victims Now Prove
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On September 28, 1981, armed officers of the Springfield, Massa-
chusetts police department embarked on a high-speed chase of Clin-
ton Thurston, a suspect in an assault case. One officer drew his gun
with the intent to kill. Another fired several shots into the driver's
seat. When the car stopped, a third struck Thurston on the head
with his flashlight. The officers then dragged the suspect, uncon-
scious, from his car, and handcuffed him. Thurston died a short time
later from a bullet wound to his brain.1
Adolph Lyons was stopped by two officers of the Los Angeles Po-
lice Department on October 6, 1976, at 2:00 a.m. because one of his
taillights was burned out. The policemen greeted the 24-year old
black man with drawn revolvers. He was told to face his car, spread
his legs, and clasp his hands on top of his head. Although Lyons
complied, one of the officers grabbed his hands, slammed them onto
his head, handcuffed him, and choked him until he blacked out.
When Lyons regained consciousness, he was lying on the ground,
spitting up blood and dirt. He had urinated and defecated. He was
issued a traffic citation and released.2
1. Kibbe v. City of Springfield, 777 F.2d 801, 802-03, 807 (1st Cir. 1985), cert. granted, 475
U.S. 1064 (1986), cert. dismissed, 107 S. Ct. 1114 (1987).
2. City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 114-15 (1983) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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Believing that the police had violated their constitutional rights, Thur-
ston's heirs and Adolph Lyons sought redress under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,1
which provides for civil rights suits against government officials. These
plaintiffs sued not only the individuals who fired the shots or used the
chokehold but also the police departments of Springfield and Los Angeles,
which they contended had failed to train and supervise the officers prop-
erly.4 Like many other victims of police abuse, they sought substantial
compensation 5 and systemwide change6 by holding the city accountable for
the injurious consequences of its inaction.
Yet the ability of plaintiffs to obtain such relief may now be in jeop-
ardy. When the Supreme Court opened the door to institutional litigation
under section 1983,7 it held that a city government8 could be subject to
liability whenever an official "policy or custom" caused a constitutional
tort.9 While declining to elaborate fully on its test,"0 the Court noted that
3. "Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any
State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the
United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privi-
leges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an
action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress." 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982).
4. Lois Thurston Kibbe maintained that the department's failure to train its officers in the appre-
hension of fleeing drivers led to Thurston's death. Kibbe v. City of Springfield, 777 F.2d 801, 803-04
(1st Cir. 1985), cert. granted, 475 U.S. 1064 (1986), cert. dismissed, 107 S. Ct. 1114 (1987). Lyons
objected to the city's toleration of the use of chokeholds against unresisting suspects. City of Los
Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 116, 120-21 (1983) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
5. Actions against individual officers may fail to provide relief altogether, since the police are
entitled to a qualified, "good faith" immunity and because those who are not indemnified by the
municipality may have little to offer in the way of compensatory damages. See P. SCHUCK, SUING
GOVERNMENT 85-87, 90 (1983); Project, Suing the Police in Federal Court, 88 YALE L.J. 781
(1979).
6. The administratix of Thurston's estate, Lois Thurston Kibbe, sought money damages from the
city of Springfield. Lyons prayed for financial and injunctive relief in his suit against the Los Angeles
Police Department. Court-enforced injunctions are expected to produce changes in municipal practice;
the payment of large damage awards may also prod municipalities into instituting reforms.
7. Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
8. Although a municipality is considered a "person" for purposes of § 1983, it can, of course, act
only through its officials. Accordingly, Monell and subsequent cases have affirmed that municipal
liability is triggered by the tortious acts of high-ranking government employees. In police misconduct
litigation, policymaking authorities generally include not only elected representatives but also the lead-
ing officials of the law enforcement agency. See, e.g., Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469,
482-84 (1986); see also City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, No. 86-772 (U.S. Mar. 2, 1988) (LEXIS,
Genfed library, U.S. file) (who may be considered "final decisionmaking authority" for purposes of §
1983 municipal liability is a question of state and local law).
9. Monell, 436 U.S. at 694. The Court created the "policy or custom" test in an effort to distin-
guish cognizable claims from those brought under the theory of respondeat superior. Monell held that
the mere existence of an employer-employee relationship would not trigger municipal liability under §
1983. Id. at 691.
The Court's rejection of respondeat superior liability is difficult to defend in light of both the
statute's legislative history and the problems that arise in deciding under what circumstances munici-
pal liability may attach. The Court based its decision on the Forty-second Congress' rejection of the
Sherman Amendment, which would have imposed liability on local governments for the unconstitu-
tional acts of private citizens, without regard to whether the city had attempted to prevent the viola-
tions. While the Court took note of the difference between "the wrongs of a few private citizens" and
the torts of a municipality's employees, it premised its holding on the failure of the Reconstruction
Congress to impose vicarious liability in the one instance in which it was debated. Id. at 693 n.57.
This rationale for rejecting respondeat superior has been roundly criticized by one Justice and by
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a "policy" need not be formal or written to be actionable,"a and that the
statute should be construed so as to provide a broad remedy.1 2 But recent
pronouncements of the Court offer a conception of the policy or custom
test"3 that would limit municipal liability for omission to only the most
numerous legal scholars. Justice Stevens, who deemed this aspect of Monell "merely advisory," con-
tinues to assert that allowing respondeat would be the correct interpretation. Id. at 714 (Stevens, J.,
concurring); see also City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 834-44 (1985) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting). For scholarly criticism, see Schnapper, Civil Rights Litigation after MonelI, 79 COLUNI.
L. REV. 213, 215 n.15 (1979); Whitman, Government Responsibility for Constitutional Torts, 85 U.
MICH. L. REv. 225, 236 & n.43 (1986); Note, Section 1983 Municipal Liability, and the Doctrine of
Respondeat Superior, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 935, 940-47 (1979).
Because the employer is generally in the best position to deter harm and implement reform, rejec-
tion of the doctrine is vulnerable to further attack on public policy grounds. See P. SCHUCK, supra
note 5, at 100-05, 111-12, 119-21 (1983). However, as the Court has repeatedly affirmed its commit-
ment to the "policy or custom" approach, this Note will not attempt to argue for adoption of respon-
deat superior liability under § 1983. See Pembaur, 475 U.S. at 478-79; Tuttle, 471 U.S. at 818.
10. Monell, 436 U.S. at 695.
11. Id. at 691 & n.56.
Rarely will victims of police brutality be able to point to a specific municipal regulation authorizing
police misconduct. Instead, plaintiffs assert departmental responsibility by identifying practices within
the department that allowed the misconduct to occur. The two most common claims are that the city
failed to train or prepare its officers properly ("inadequate training") or that it tacitly authorized
brutality by failing to punish previous misconduct ("negligent supervision" or "failure to control").
Related allegations include negligent hiring (for example, admitting to the force an applicant with
cognizable violent propensities) or retention. For a discussion of the various theories of supervisory
liability for police misconduct, see Note, Municipal Liability for Requiring Unfit Police Officers to
Carry Guns, 11 FORDHAM URB. L. J. 1001, 1012-16 (1983); Note, Monell and Owen in the Police
Injury Context: Municipal Liability under Section 1983 Without Supervisorial Fault, 16 U.S.F. L.
REV. 517, 521 (1982).
12. Monell, 436 U.S. at 685.
While the Monell Court did not comment directly on whether failures or omissions could constitute
policy or custom, its discussion of one leading police misconduct case, Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362
(1976), is instructive. In Rizzo, the Court denied relief on the theory that plaintiffs had not shown an
"affirmative link" between municipal conduct and the alleged abuse. Id. at 371. Monell limited the
Rizzo decision to the proposition that "the mere right to control without any control or direction
having been exercised and without any failure to supervise is not enough to support § 1983 liability."
Monell, 436 U.S. at 694 n.58 (emphasis added). The implication here is that had plaintiffs proved a
failure to supervise, their claim against the City of Philadelphia would have been colorable.
In the ten years since Monell was decided, most courts entertaining suits against police departments
have considered "inadequate training" or "failure to supervise"-the theories of liability on which
most plaintiffs base their municipal claims-cognizable under the policy or custom test. See, e.g.,
Depew v. City of St. Marys, 787 F.2d 1496 (11th Cir. 1986) (plaintiff's claim that city failed to
respond to previous complaints of beatings by police actionable under § 1983); Herrera v. Valentine,
653 F.2d 1220 (8th Cir. 1981) (continuing failure to remedy known unconstitutional conduct of of-
ficers is informal policy or custom amenable to suit under § 1983); Hardeman v. Clark, 593 F. Supp.
1285 (D.D.C. 1984) (allegation that improper training in use of blackjack responsible for plaintiff's
injury found cognizable). See also Eiland v. Hardesty, 564 F. Supp. 930 (N.D. Ill. 1982) (allegations
that improper screening, hiring, training, supervising, controlling, and disciplining encouraged mis-
conduct and proximately caused plaintiff's injuries stated claim); Starstead v. City of Superior, 533 F.
Supp. 1365 (W.D. Wis. 1982) (plaintiff need not point to specific municipal rule where "policy"
could be inferred from systematic pattern of misuse of police dogs).
However, judicial treatment of the standard of proof necessary for a plaintiff to prevail in an inade-
quate training case has varied. Some courts have held "negligence" or "gross negligence" in training
actionable. See, e.g., Berquist v. County of Cochise, 806 F.2d 1364 (9th Cir. 1986); McKinnon v. City
of Berwyn, 750 F.2d 1383 (7th Cir. 1984). Others have required a higher standard, such as training
that "inevitably" leads to misconduct or is "consciously" or "deliberately indifferent" to plaintiff's
rights. See, e.g., Patzner v. Burkett, 779 F.2d 1363 (8th Cir. 1985); Languirand v. Hayden, 717 F.2d
220 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1215 (1984). See infra notes 17 and 25 and accompanying
text.
13. Courts and legal scholars have debated whether allegations of inadequate training and negli-
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flagrant misconduct. These opinions suggest that a showing of explicit au-
thorization or intent 4 may be necessary before a city can be found liable
for violating constitutional rights.
This Note argues that this emerging trend, not yet adopted by a major-
ity of the Court, 5 should be rejected. Section I exposes the intent require-
ment implicit in three recent opinions by members of the Court. Section II
explores the flaws in this approach, showing that it both betrays funda-
mental misconceptions about how cities cause harm and contravenes the
legislative purpose of the civil rights statute. Section III offers a proposal
for judicial consideration of municipal inaction claims that is based on
objective assessments of government responsibility and is consistent with
the purposes of section 1983 and the Court's own "policy or custom" test.
I. EMERGING PROOF-OF-INTENT REQUIREMENT
The Supreme Court has never directly addressed the issue of when a
police department's failure to act may trigger section 1983 liability. But in
three of the major police misconduct cases to come to the Court in recent
years, several of the Justices have indicated that only intentional omissions
or direct authorization should subject a municipality to suit under Monell.
A. City of Springfield v. Kibbe
In a detailed dissent from dismissal of certiorari in City of Springfield
v. Kibbe, 6 four Justices maintained that plaintiffs should prevail on a
theory of inadequate police training only when they can offer proof of
municipal intent. Ratifying the approach taken by a number of lower
gent supervision should be considered official "policy" or "custom." See Oliver, Municipal Liability
for Police Misconduct under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 after City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 64 WASH.
U.L.Q. 151, 180-85 (1986) (inadequate training presupposes "policy" choices about training pro-
grams and does not require pattern or "custom" evidence to establish); see also Comment, Liability of
a Municipalityfor Acts Committed by Its Police Officers: Inadequate Training Demands Strict Cus-
tom or Policy Test, 53 U. CIN. L. REV. 524 (1984). Some courts have confused the two concepts by
requiring both a "policy" of inadequate training and a "custom" of abuse under that policy before
liability can be imposed. See Wellington v. Daniels, 717 F.2d 932, 936 (4th Cir. 1983); Languirand v.
Hayden, 717 F.2d 220, 227-28 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1215 (1984). Plaintiffs, mean-
while, generally use both terms in their pleadings ("a policy or custom of inadequate training") to
avoid dismissal. As the analytic distinctions between the two are not critical to this discussion, they
will not be considered here.
14. See infra notes 16-44 and accompanying text.
The term "intent" is used by courts and commentators to explain several related concepts and is not
easily defined. See W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS § 8, at 33 (1984). The search
for intent usually focuses directly on the actor's state of mind. Id. § 8, at 34; Daniels v. Williams, 474
U.S. 327, 329-30 (1986) (claim of discriminatory purpose necessitates state-of-mind inquiry). Intent
can be said to include not only a desire to bring about certain consequences but also a belief or
knowledge that given consequences are substantially certain to result from what one does. W. PRos-
SER & W. KEETON § 8, at 34.
15. See infra notes 16-35 and accompanying text. The elevation of Judge Anthony Kennedy to
the Court renders future treatment of this issue particularly uncertain. Judge Kennedy's few opinions
on municipal liability shed little light on how he will analyze § 1983 claims premised on inaction.
16. 107 S. Ct. 1114 (1987). See supra notes 1-6 and accompanying text.
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courts,17 these dissenters would preclude relief unless a plaintiff could
show "deliberate indifference" 8 or "recklessness" 19 by officials in choos-
ing the training procedures in question.
After challenging the majority's view on the posture of the case,2" Jus-
tice O'Connor's dissent 21 proceeded to reject grossly negligent training as
a "policy" embraced by Monell. The dissent based its determination on
the importance of distinguishing actionable claims against municipalities
from those alleging vicarious liability. " Characterizing the causal link be-
tween inadequate training and the use of excessive force as "inherently
tenuous," speculative, and conjectural," the dissenters argued that only a
"cognitive component" could establish the proof of causation required by
Monell. 24 In their view, no wrong could be ascribed to municipal deci-
sionmakers who had not acted recklessly or deliberately.
The vigorous Kibbe dissent is critical: Although it constitutes only a
minority view at present, it is the first time a significant segment of the
Court has called openly for an intent-based liability test for municipal
17. Id. at 1121 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). See infra note 25.
18. Id. The Supreme Court understands the "deliberate indifference" standard to require an in-
quiry into the state of mind of the actor. See Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 329-30 (1986); see
also supra note 14.
This test originated in Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976) (allegations of medical malpractice in
prison). The Estelle Court held that a prisoner "must allege acts or omissions sufficiently harmful to
evidence deliberate indifference to serious medical needs" in order to claim a violation of the Eighth
Amendment. Id. at 106. For a discussion of why that standard should not be borrowed by courts
entertaining municipal liability claims, see infra notes 45-72 and accompanying text; see also Oliver,
supra note 13, at 164-65; Note, Monell and Owen in the Police Injury Context, supra note 11, at
525.
19. Kibbe, 107 S. Ct. at 1121 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). The Court also views "recklessness" as
necessitating a state-of-mind inquiry. See Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344, 356-58 (1986) (Black-
mun, J., dissenting).
20. Plaintiff's claim that negligent police training caused the shooting of her decedent prevailed at
trial and was upheld by the First Circuit. The City of Springfield then appealed to the Supreme
Court. Kibbe certified the question of whether inadequate training could be considered a "policy"
actionable under Monell and, if so, whether simple or "gross" negligence could suffice to establish
liability. However, the Court dismissed the case on the ground that the municipal defendant had not
preserved the issue by objecting during trial to the standard imposed. Kibbe, 107 S. Ct. at 1115-16. A
per curiam opinion held that due to the "close interrelationship" between the viability of the theory
and the standard of proof, neither question could be considered. Id. The dissent nevertheless con-
tended that the Court should have addressed the issue because it had been decided by the court of
appeals. Id. at 1118-19 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
21. The dissent was joined by Justices Powell and White and Chief Justice Rehnquist.
22. "Given the importance, under § 1983, of distinguishing between direct and vicarious liability,
the Court repeatedly has stressed the need to find a direct causal connection between municipal con-
duct and the constitutional deprivation .... Negligence in training alone is not sufficient to satisfy the
causation requirement of § 1983." Id. at 1120, 1121 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
23. Id. at 1121, 1122. The dissenters distinguished Kibbe's "tenuous" allegation from a presuma-
bly colorable claim that the city "authorized" the use of deadly force in apprehending fleeing felons.
Id. at 1120 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
24. Id. at 1121.
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omission.25 Lower courts have already cited the dissent in their treatment
of inaction claims.28
B. City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle
The standard announced in the Kibbe dissent was foreshadowed by
strong dicta in City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle,"7 a 1985 police brutality
case. Rose Marie Tuttle, the widow of a man shot by a city policeman,
sued the Oklahoma City government for permitting the use of excessive
force through improper training and supervision. The Court reviewed the
case because an instruction had allowed the Tuttle jury to infer the exis-
tence of a policy from this officer's act alone, absent any independent evi-
dence on municipal behavior.28 Seven Justices concurred in the decision to
overturn the jury award due to the erroneous instruction.
But Justice Rehnquist's plurality opinion 29 went beyond the narrow
holding to challenge the concept of omission-as-policy. Deeming inade-
quate training a "nebulous" allegation not easily amenable to the causa-
tion inquiry,3" the plurality would require a plaintiff to submit proof that
"policymakers deliberately chose a training program which would prove
25. A number of lower courts were already employing a proof-of-intent standard in the inade-
quate training context. See, e.g., Patzner v. Burkett, 779 F.2d 1363, 1367 (8th Cir. 1985) (for munici-
pality to be held liable, training must be conducted in so grossly negligent a manner that police
misconduct inevitably occurs); Hays v. Jefferson County, 668 F.2d 869, 873-74 (6th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 459 U.S. 833 (1982) (court denied claim for lack of proof that city had "a culpable state of
mind-that the action or failure to act was to some degree deliberate rather than inadvertent"); see
also Fecteau v. Unknown Officers of Clinton, 596 F. Supp. 580, 583 (E.D. Mich. 1984) (failure to
train must be so grossly inadequate that misconduct is certain to result); Sager v. City of Woodland
Park, 543 F. Supp. 282, 289 n.5 (D. Colo. 1982) (training so negligent that future harm almost
inevitable).
Several courts utilize the "deliberate indifference" phrase preferred by the Kibbe dissenters. See,
e.g., Wellington v. Daniels, 717 F.2d 932, 936 (4th Cir. 1983); Turpin v. Mailet, 619 F.2d 196, 202
(2d. Cir.), cert. denied sub nom Turpin v. City of West Haven, 449 U.S. 1016 (1980); Caiani v.
Town of Walpole, 624 F.Supp. 311, 314 n.5 (D. Mass. 1985); Spell v. McDaniel, 591 F. Supp.
1090, 1110 (E.D.N.C. 1984); Leite v. City of Providence, 463 F. Supp. 585, 590 (D.R.I. 1978). But
see Edmonds v. Dillin, 485 F. Supp. 722, 727 (N.D. Ohio 1980) ("Because this court believes that the
'deliberate indifference' standard of Estelle v. Gamble should be confined to Eighth Amendment ap-
plications, this court declines to adopt it in fashioning a Monell standard applicable to a police train-
ing case."). See also infra notes 45-72 and accompanying text.
Finally, some judges have used the terms "gross negligence" and "deliberate indifference" inter-
changeably, see, e.g., Clayton v. City of New York, 596 F. Supp. 355 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (gross negli-
gence or deliberate indifference required). The Kibbe dissent differentiated between the two in re-
jecting the former as a legitimate policy under Monell.
Given the wide disagreement among the courts as to the appropriate standard to apply (see supra
note 12), it is highly likely that the Court will again face the question ultimately dismissed in Kibbe.
26. See, e.g., Tompkins v. Frost, 655 F. Supp. 468, 471 (E.D. Mich. 1987); see also Lopez v.
Houston Indep. School Dist., 817 F.2d 351, 354 (5th Cir. 1987).
27. 471 U.S. 808 (1985).
28. Tuttle had offered independent proof of inadequate training, relying largely on expert evalua-
tions of Oklahoma City Police Department programs. Id. at 811-12. The instruction, however, al-
lowed the jury to find the department liable even if it did not deem the plaintiff's evidence credi-
ble-that is, even without proof that the acts or omissions of a policymaker were tortious.
29. Chief Justice Burger and Justices White and O'Connor joined this opinion.
30. Id. at 822-23.
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inadequate."'" These Justices expressed doubt as to whether gross negli-
gence in training could ever give rise to liability absent a "more conscious
decision"32 by a municipal authority.
Like the cognitive component sought by the Kibbe dissent, the search
for a "conscious decision" would force plaintiffs to determine the conse-
quences supervisors envisioned when they chose to train or discipline in a
particular manner. 3 Under the plurality approach, police officials could
escape liability where their omissions permitted misconduct but where
they themselves had not foreseen the result.3 Despite the limited nature
of Tuttle's formal holding, courts have interpreted the plurality opinion as
requiring a state-of-mind inquiry where inadequate training is alleged. 5
C. City of Los Angeles v. Lyons
When police brutality victims have sought equitable relief, a majority of
the Court has rejected municipal omission as a basis for remedial action.
31. Id. at 823. These Justices would require proof that "the inadequacies resulted from conscious
choice." Id. They expressed the fear that without such proof plaintiffs could go so far as to contend
that the "policy" of establishing a police force caused their injuries.
32. Id. at 824 n.7. The opinion distinguished between policies that are themselves unconstitu-
tional, such as the regulation challenged in Monell, and those that are not, such as grossly inadequate
training, implying that the latter might not fit within the "policy or custom" framework. Id. This
distinction, unsupported by the language of Monell, has been endorsed in dicta in later cases. See, e.g.,
City of Springfield v. Kibbe, 107 S. Ct. 1114, 1121-22 (1987) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (policies not
facially unconstitutional require more evidence to establish); City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, No. 86-
772 (U.S. Mar. 2 1988) (LEXIS, Genfed library, U.S. file) (plaintiff must prove existence of uncon-
stitutional policy to recover). But see id. (Brennan, J., concurring) (Kibbe and Tuttle reserved ques-
tion of whether policy not unconstitutional on its face can cause constitutional deprivation; despite
plurality language suggesting otherwise, Praprotnik did not decide issue).
33. By requiring proof that police officials knew that their programs were deficient when they
chose them, the Tuttle plurality mandated a showing of municipal intent. See supra note 14. Some
trial judges and litigants have explicitly interpreted the opinion as requiring proof of intent. See infra
note 35.
34. Commentators have criticized the Tuttle opinion for conflating Monell's policy and causation
inquiries and for imposing an unacceptable burden of proof on the police misconduct plaintiff. See
Oliver, supra note 13, at 177-79; Comment, Municipal Liability under Section 1983: Rethinking
"Policy or Custom" after City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 71 IOWA L. REv. 1209, 1222-29 (1986);
see also Mead, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Municipal Liability: The Monell Sketch Becomes a Distorted
Picture, 65 N.C.L. REv. 517, 555-56 (1987) (if Court concludes that policies not in themselves un-
constitutional fail to meet Monell requirement, inadequate training claims will be eradicated).
35. See, e.g., Carter v. District of Columbia, 795 F.2d 116 (D.C. Cir. 1986); Kelson v. City of
Springfield, 767 F.2d 651, 656 (9th Cir. 1985); Kime v. Wise, 634 F. Supp. 514, 517 (N.D. Ohio
1985); Martin v. City of New York, 627 F. Supp. 892 (E.D.N.Y. 1985); Mariani v. City of Pitts-
burgh, 624 F. Supp. 506 (W.D. Pa. 1985); Boren v. City of Colorado Springs, 624 F. Supp. 474,
480-81 (D.Colo. 1985).
Municipalities challenging the inadequacy claims against them have also cited Tuttle as a bar to
such allegations. See, e.g., Fiacco v. City of Rensselaer, 783 F.2d 319, 326 (2d Cir. 1986) (defendant
claimed municipal policy must be unconstitutional or intentionally pursued to create liability); see also
Western World Ins. Co. v. Hartford Mutual Ins. Co., 784 F.2d 558, 563 (4th Cir. 1986) (insurance
company seeking to avoid paying judgment interpreted Tuttle to hold supervisory officials liable only
for intentional conduct).
Some lower courts, however, have rejected Tuttle's burden of proof or limited that case to its facts.
See, e.g., Wierstak v. Heffernan, 789 F.2d 968 (1st Cir. 1986) (liability upheld for failure to train
where arrestee was beaten with revolver since plaintiff submitted direct testimony on both training
and institutional failure to respond and expert presented evidence as to proximate causation).
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In City of Los Angeles v. Lyons,"6 plaintiff sued to enjoin the Los Angeles
Police Department from using a dangerous, often deadly "chokehold" on
nonviolent suspects. After requiring that Lyons establish standing sepa-
rately for his equitable and legal claims,3" the Court demanded proof that
he would again be subject to the tactic before injunctive relief would even
be considered. But because Lyons could not show that the department
affirmatively ordered use of the chokehold where no resistance was offered
(or that officers used the device in every citizen encounter), the Court
found the threat of future injury a matter of "speculation" and "conjec-
ture' 83 and denied standing for the equitable claim. 9
While the majority maintained that Lyons could still pursue a damages
remedy,4 ° its search for affirmative municipal authorization rendered the
legal claim equally problematic. Looking only to official regulation and
instruction, the Court averred that it was an "unbelievable assertion that
the City either orders or authorizes application of the chokeholds where
there is no resistance or other provocation." 4 The Justices declined to
entertain plaintiff's actual claim that the city countenanced misuse of the
tactic by failing to take corrective action.42 They implicitly refused to rec-
36. 461 U.S. 95 (1982). See supra notes 2-6 and accompanying text.
37. The bifurcation of the standing inquiry has been widely criticized as an improvident innova-
tion that undermines the purposes of § 1983. See Nahmod, Damages and Injunctive Relief under
Section 1983, 16 URB. LAW. 201, 213-16 (1984); Comment, City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 30
N.Y.L. Sc. L. REv. 165, 190-91 (1985); Note, Standing and Injunctions: The Demise of Public
Law Litigation and Other Effects of Lyons, 25 B.C.L. REv. 765, 794-97 (1984).
38. Lyons, 461 U.S. at 108.
39. Lower courts have already denied injunctions to alleged victims of police abuse based on the
Lyons analysis. See Comment, supra note 37, at 186 n.138; Note, supra note 37, at 767-68 & n.26;
see also Schmidtberger, No Holds Barred in City of Los Angeles v. Lyons: Standing to Seek Injunc-
tions in Federal Court Against Municipalities, 15 COLUM. HUM. RrS. L. REv. 183, 197-98 (1984)
(Lyons may foreclose injunctions in all but most obvious and ongoing cases of constitutional violations;
Court seems to be allowing injunctions only with proof of deliberate municipal wrongdoing).
40. Although it discussed the action for damages, the Court actually decided only the equitable
claim. In addition to its demand that plaintiff prove certainty of future harm, the Court's ruling on
the injunction was guided by the view that the judiciary should exercise restraint when asked to enjoin
the operations of local agencies. Lyons, 461 U.S. at 112.
41. Id. at 106 n.7 (emphasis added).
42. Yet the dissent understood-and the district court established as a finding of fact-that Lyons
was claiming that the city's toleration of such use of the device rendered it liable for the injuries he
suffered. Id. at 121-22 (Marshall, J., dissenting). For similar treatment of an analogous claim in
equity, see Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 373-76 (1975) (distinguishing between an intentional plan
undertaken by the city, which might give rise to liability, and a failure to act, which did not); id. at
383-86 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (majority rejected district court's factual determination that depart-
mental failure to act was cause of plaintiffs' injuries in that it rendered brutality likely to recur).
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ognize that conduct short of direct authorization 3 could constitute "pol-
icy" actionable under Monell.44
II. REQUIRING PROOF OF INTENT OR AUTHORIZATION Is
INAPPROPRIATE
If the Court adopts the standard articulated in the Kibbe dissent (and
implicit in Tuttle and Lyons) police administrators will be subject to lia-
bility only for deliberate omissions or explicit authorization of misconduct.
But when municipal responsibility is alleged under section 1983, the de-
mand for proof of intent is wholly inappropriate.
Supreme Court jurisprudence has continually reaffirmed that section
1983 imposes no blanket state-of-mind inquiry on all litigants.45 When
the Court has required proof of intent under the statute, it has done so in
order to establish violations of specific constitutional guarantees, such as
the Eighth Amendment's ban on cruel and unusual punishment 46 or the
Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection 47 and due process48 clauses. In
these cases, the constitutional harm is defined in terms of the defendant's
43. Sometimes the Court's treatment of municipal claims evinces a seemingly inadvertent focus on
authorization. Such was probably the case in Justice Brennan's opinion in Pembaur v. City of Cincin-
nati, 475 U.S. 469 (1986) (county official's single order to subordinates to violate petitioner's Fourth
Amendment rights constituted "policy" within the meaning of Monell). While the case has been read
as expanding the scope of municipal liability, the plurality in Pembaur adopted language from Tuttle
that could jeopardize a remedy for some § 1983 plaintiffs. After holding for the plaintiff-petitioner,
the Court set out the circumstances under which a city might be held liable for the acts of its high-
ranking officials. Justice Brennan stated that "municipal liability under § 1983 attaches where-and
only where-a deliberate choice to follow a course of action is made from among various alternatives."
Id. at 483.
While this language was probably not intended to restrict claims against municipalities, lower
courts have read the opinion to require an inquiry into the state of mind of a policymaker where
failures to act form the basis of a plaintiff's claim. See, e.g., Strandell v. Jackson City, 648 F. Supp.
126, 130 (S.D. I1. 1986) (Tuttle and Pembaur indicate need for deliberation and conscious action for
municipal liability to be imposed); Bartalone v. County of Berrien, 643 F. Supp. 574, 577-78 (W.D.
Mich. 1986) (Pembaur holding on deliberation reinforces standard of "inevitability" of misconduct);
City of Miami v. Harris, 490 So. 2d 69, 75 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986) (misconduct case remanded in
light of Pembaur for proof that inadequate training was result of deliberate choice on part of city).
44. The significance of the Kibbe, Tuttle, and Lyons opinions is underscored by the Court's will-
ingness to restrict state or municipal liability in other contexts. Often citing federalism concerns, the
Court has repeatedly rejected constitutional claims against local governments. See, e.g., Hudson v.
Palmer, 468 U.S. 517 (1984) (state post-deprivation remedy sufficient where prisoner suffered loss of
property); Pennhurst State School and Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89 (1984) (protections of Elev-
enth Amendment extended to preclude municipal damage awards that might ultimately be drawn
from state coffers); Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977) (Court declined to adjudicate even
though state remedy unequal to that available under § 1983). See generally Blackmun, Section 1983
and Federal Protection of Individual Rights-Will the Statute Remain Alive or Fade Away?, 60
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (1985) (criticizing recent § 1983 case law for wrongly denying plaintiffs access to
federal forum).
45. See, e.g., Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 329-30 (1986).
46. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976) (plaintiff must allege "deliberate indifference" to medi-
cal needs to state cognizable Eighth Amendment claim).
47. Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977) (proof of discrimi-
natory purpose required).
48. Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986) (negligence insufficient to implicate due process
clause).
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state of mind; plaintiffs who cannot show recklessness or deliberation will
fail to prove a deprivation of their civil rights.
But when the issue is municipal liability, the court is not being asked to
determine whether an injury is of constitutional dimension: Any citizen
who seeks to sue the city must first establish that his rights were vio-
lated.49 The court must instead decide whether the city can be held re-
sponsible for that injury. This question turns not on constitutional inter-
pretation but on construction of the Monell test and the civil rights statute
from which that test is derived.
A. Inadequate Training Satisfies Monell's Causation Inquiry
According to Monell, a police misconduct victim must prove that the
city agency had a "policy" that "caused" her injuries."0 The Kibbe dis-
senters and the Tuttle plurality doubted that these plaintiffs could satisfy
the second prong of the test: They believed that a policy of improper
training or supervision was too tenuously linked to the use of excessive
force to meet the causation requirement absent an inquiry into a supervi-
sor's state of mind.51
This characterization of the issue, however, reveals a fundamental mis-
understanding of how law enforcement authorities violate citizens' rights.
49. See, e.g., City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 816-17 (1985). For example, one
who claims that he was beaten by the police must prove that the beating was constitutionally prohib-
ited before he can proceed in a § 1983 suit against the municipality. In some cases, the use of exces-
sive force by a law enforcement agent may be considered an unlawful seizure barred by the Fourth
Amendment. Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1984). In others, courts may determine that only state
tort law was violated and that the alleged injuries are not cognizable under
§ 1983, or that the amount of force used to effect the arrest was not excessive. Tuttle, 471 U.S. at 817
n.4. The distinct legal standards involved in adjudication of the underlying constitutional claim are
beyond the scope of this Note.
Once the plaintiff has prevailed against the officer on the federal claim, he can attempt under
Monell's policy or custom test to prove municipal responsibility for his injury.
50. See supra notes 7-12 and accompanying text. See also Tuttle, 471 U.S. at 828-32 (Brennan,
J., concurring) (describing how allegations of inadequate training fit within Monell scheme).
51. See supra notes 23-25 and 30-33 and accompanying text. These members of the Court ap-
pear to be demanding deliberation, foresight, or affirmative authorization under § 1983 in an attempt
to distinguish actionable governmental conduct from respondeat superior liability. See City of Spring-
field v. Kibbe, 107 S. Ct. 1114, 1120-22 (1987) (O'Connor, J., dissenting); see also Whitman, supra
note 9, at 255 (Court is assuming all institutional liability must be vicarious or affirmative); Note,
Municipal Liability Under Section 1983: The Failure to Act as Custom or Policy, 29 WAYNE L.
REV. 1225, 1241 (1983) (courts are equating causation with action). It is also highly likely that the
Justices are motivated by concerns unexpressed in these opinions, such as a desire to insulate the
federal courts from suits purportedly more appropriate for a state forum, or to preserve local auton-
omy. See supra note 44; Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 701 (1976) (fear of federal courts becoming
"font" of tort law claims if plaintiff's injury recognized as due process violation).
While such fears may be understandable, they cannot justify denial of a federal forum to those who
can properly prove their claims. Section 1983 entitles a plaintiff who can show that her civil rights
were violated and who can satsify the Monell test to litigate her suit in federal court; redefining that
test to restrict a particular cause of action is not a defensible method for reducing caseload. Moreover,
a finding of liability would not imply severe intrusion into local affairs but would merely affirm that
cities cannot conduct their operations in a manner that impermissibly burdens citizens' rights. See
infra notes 81-83 and accompanying text. For a discussion of how the Court is straining otherwise
sound doctrines in an effort to restrict § 1983 actions, see Blackmun, supra note 44, at 2-3, 21-29.
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The indifference of supervisors-whether or not deliberate 52-may give
police officers reason to believe that they may act without fear of disci-
pline or control or may lead poorly trained officers into confrontations for
which they are ill prepared. 3 Bureaucratic inertia, poorly conceived struc-
tural arrangements, or outdated procedures may also produce constitu-
tional violations regardless of the good intentions of supervisory person-
nel." A police department that adopts ineffective disciplinary rules or
inadvertently ignores it own regulations 55 may encourage the same unlaw-
ful behavior as a department that knowingly implements faulty
procedures.
Failure to recognize the link between an administrator's unintended
omissions and the use of excessive force by subordinates has led the Jus-
tices to ignore powerful indications of causation.5 6 Contrary to the dis-
sent's assertions in Kibbe, the jury could have decided that the city bore
primary responsibility for Thurston's death .5  The plaintiff in Kibbe
presented testimony that officers were given virtually no guidance in ap-
52. Police administrators play a vital role in managing their subordinates. See, e.g., Newman,
Suing the Lawbreakers: Proposals to Strengthen the Section 1983 Damage Remedy for Law Enforc-
ers' Misconduct, 87 YALE L.J. 447, 457 (1978); P. SCHUCK, supra note 5. Where police officials
offer training without considering its adverse effects, or ignore a series of brutal incidents, their omis-
sions may indeed cause harm. See Chapman, Police Policy on the Use of Firearms, in READINGS ON
POLICE USE OF DEADLY FORCE 224, 234 (J. Fyfe ed. 1982); Rittenmeyer, Vicarious Liability in
Suits Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983: Legal Myth and Reality, 12 J. POLICE SC!. & ADMIN. 260, 265
(1984).
53. See Brown, Use of Deadly Force by Patrol Officers: Training Implications, 12 J. POLICE SC!.
& ADMIN. 133 (1984); (improved training reduces likelihood of excessive shooting); Davis, An Ap-
proach to Legal Control of the Police, 52 TEx. L. REv. 703, 723 (1974) (indifference of supervisors
critical in perpetuating police misconduct); Meagher, Organizational Integrity: The Role of the Police
Executive in the Management Process, 13 J. POLICE SC!. & ADMIN. 236, 237 (1985) (strong adminis-
trative stand against misconduct alters behavior of officers); Reiss, Controlling Police Use of Deadly
Force, 452 ANNALS Am. ACAD. POL & Soc. SC!. 122, 131, 142-44 (1980) (actions of supervisory
personnel can reduce police violence).
54. See Whitman, supra note 9, at 249-54 (institutions create injurious consequences through
their very structures).
55. See Chapman, supra note 52, at 234 (administrators' failures may result from inadvertent
neglect or conscious avoidance); Fyfe, Observations on Police Deadly Force, in READINGS ON POLICE
USE OF DEADLY FORCE, supra note 52, at 297, 307-08 (failure to formulate policy usually uncon-
scious); Rittenmeyer, supra note 52, at 265 (omissions usually basis of supervisory torts). Depart-
ments may institute practices in an attempt to achieve conflicting goals and may thus fail in their
mandate to address unconstitutional behavior. See, e.g., Manning, Violence and the Police Rule, 452
ANNALS Am. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SC!. 135, 141 (1980) (rather than rational response to pattern of
violations, police disciplinary rules tend to be reflection of organizational need to avoid
embarrassment).
56. In City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1982), that failure precluded even an accurate
characterization of the policy alleged. Id. at 120-22 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
57. Justice O'Connor dismissed the possibility that a jury could reasonably find that the city's
omissions caused the harm:
To conclude, in a particular instance, that omissions in a municipal training program consti-
tuted the "moving force" in bringing about the officer's unconstitutional conduct . . . appears
to be largely a matter of speculation and conjecture. . . . [A] jury should be permitted to find
that the municipality's inadequate training "caused" the plaintiff's injury only if the inade-
quacy of the training amounts to deliberate indifference or reckless disregard for the
consequences.
Kibbe, 107 S. Ct. at 1120-21 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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prehending suspects fleeing in their cars and little training in applying
regulations on the use of firearms. The court of appeals determined that,
based on this and other evidence, the jury might have found that training
in methods other than the use of deadly force would have prevented the
death of Clinton Thurston and that the city was at fault for sending the
officers to apprehend the suspect without the necessary preparation.58
If a plaintiff can prove that her injuries resulted from institutional iner-
tia or neglect, she will satisfy the Monell causation requirement without
any showing of municipal intent. 59 The appropriate inquiry in assessing
municipal liability is not whether policymakers intended or envisioned
harm but whether their failure to act led the offending officer to violate a
citizen's rights.60
58. Kibbe v. City of Springfield, 777 F.2d 801, 805-08 (1st Cir. 1985), cert. granted, 475 U.S.
1064 (1986), cert. dismissed, 107 S. Ct. 1114 (1987). Similarly, despite the Tuttle plurality's prefer-
ence for "conscious choices," the expert testimony Tuttle offered on the nature and potential implica-
tions of the offending officer's training could have sufficed to establish causation. City of Oklahoma
City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 826, 830-33 (1985) (Brennan, J., concurring).
59. See Tuttle, 471 U.S. at 833 n.8 (1985) (Brennan, J., concurring) (if municipality takes ac-
tions, whether of type alleged in Monell or in Tuttle, that cause deprivation of citizen's rights,
§ 1983 is available as remedy).
The Supreme Court has noted in the past that municipal institutions can cause harm inadvertently.
When it denied municipal corporations a qualified, "good faith" immunity in Owen v. City of Inde-
pendence, 445 U.S. 622 (1980), the Court remarked that "systemic" injuries can result even when
policymakers act with good intentions, and that the compensation and deterrence functions of § 1983
would not be properly served if cities escaped liability for unintentional injuries:
Moreover, section 1983 was intended not only to provide compensation to the victims of past
abuses, but to serve as a deterrent against future constitutional deprivations, as well ...
Furthermore, the threat that damages might be levied against the city may encourage those in
a policymaking position to institute internal rules and programs designed to minimize the
likelihood of unintentional infringements on constitutional rights. Such procedures are particu-
larly beneficial in preventing those "systemic" injuries that result not so much from the con-
duct of any single individual, but from the interactive behavior of several government officials,
each of whom may be acting in good faith.
Id. at 651-52 (footnotes omitted).
The Court has also indicated that a search for "malicious intent" is not appropriate where munici-
palities are concerned. See City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 267 (1981) (in
denying availability of punitive damages against city under § 1983, Court noted that because govern-
ment entity cannot act with malice such damages are not sensibly assessed against it).
60. The recent refusal by members of the Court to recognize the harm caused by unintended
omissions has been made evident in the due process context as well. In Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S.
327 (1986), and Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344 (1986), plaintiffs alleged due process violations
when prison officials failed to safeguard their property and liberty. Daniels injured himself by trip-
ping on a pillow left on the jail stairs by a sheriff; Davidson, however, was assaulted by another
inmate after a guard ignored his written plea for protection.
The Court maintained that neither prisoner's civil rights had been violated and distinguished these
cases from those in which government officials make a deliberate decision to deprive a person of life,
liberty, or property. Daniels, 474 U.S. at 331, 333-34. The majority contended that the federal courts
should not be entertaining law suits in which there has been "no affirmative abuse of power." Id. at
330 (quoting Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 548-49 (1981) (Powell, J., concurring in the
judgment)).
But in his dissent in Davidson, Justice Blackmun argued that whether the prison guards intended
to harm Davidson was immaterial to his cause of action. The guards neglected his plea for protection
despite the substantial risk of harm; according to the dissent, such a failure to act constituted an abuse
of power within the meaning of the due process clause. Davidson, 474 U.S. at 354-56 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting).
Justice Blackmun's opinion makes clear that the relevant inquiry for omission is not always "intent
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B. Intent Requirement Undermines Legislative Purpose of
Section 1983
The emerging limitations on the inaction theory not only restrict Mo-
nell unnecessarily but also vitiate the legislative intent underlying 42
U.S.C. § 1983. Originally enacted as section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of
1871, section 1983 was created to give citizens a remedy where their local
government failed to protect their rights. The Reconstruction Congress
was specifically concerned with the refusal of local officials to act when
the Ku Klux Klan terrorized blacks. Congress deemed the provision nec-
essary precisely because the police would not enforce the law: The re-
corded history of the Act is replete with descriptions of violent and brutal
conduct left unpunished by helpless or complicit authorities. 61
The legislative debates offer no hint that the authors of the provision
wished to reach only the actions-as opposed to the omissions-of local
authorities. On the contrary, members of Congress repeatedly expressed
concern that the federal remedy not be limited to "lawless acts ... done in
pursuance of any law or act,"62 but that it provide redress where munici-
palities "quietly permitted"6 violence to recur or where states were
"powerless" ' 64 or "unable" 65 to take action. At least one supporter in the
Forty-second Congress noted the futility of limiting the provision's cover-
age to overt deeds:
It is said that the States are not doing the objectionable acts. This
argument is more specious than real. . . .What practical security
would this provision give if it could do no more than to abrogate and
nullify the overt acts and legislation of a State? If a State ... never-
theless permits the rights of citizens to be systematically trampled
upon . . . of what avail is the Constitution to the citizen?66
Nor is there any indication that the statute was meant to cover only
intentional deprivations of rights. The Act was passed not because govern-
ment actors necessarily meant to harm blacks but because they were una-
versus negligence" but whether the institution took an unacceptable risk in failing to act: "In some
cases, by any reasonable standard, governmental negligence is an abuse of power.... In some circum-
stances the risk of injury is so high that the government's failure to make efforts to avoid the injury is
unacceptable, even if its omission still might be categorized as negligence." Id. at 353 & n.2 (citations
omitted; emphasis added) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
61. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 155 (1871) (remarks of Sen. Sherman) (black
preacher found lynched; no one arrested or tried) ; id. (warrant issued after men were severely beaten
but investigation cut off after mobs threatened violence); id. at 158 (remarks of Sen. Sherman) (in the
face of uncontroverted evidence, grand juries refused to indict; prosecutors hounded out of town).
62. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 375 (1875) (remarks of Rep. Lowe).
63. Id.
64. Id. at 322 (remarks of Rep. Stoughton).
65. Id. at 653 (remarks of Sen. Osborn).
66. Id. at 375 (remarks of Rep. Lowe); see also Blackmun, supra note 44, at 16 (§ 1983 was
meant to reach activity of persons who did not necessarily have formal authorization of state); Monroe
v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 174 (1961) (failure of states to enforce laws furnished momentum behind bill).
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ble or afraid, regardless of their intentions, to take action on these citizens'
behalf.67 In fact, some legislators in the Forty-second Congress opposed
the bill precisely because it would impose liability without regard to
"willfulness.""8
The Forty-second Congress was concerned not with whether local au-
thorities contemplated the consequences of their inaction but with whether
a federal remedy was appropriate where municipal neglect caused harm. 9
A court-imposed intent requirement would severely hinder the victim of
police misconduct from obtaining redress under section 1983.70 The ulti-
mate effect of the trend toward authorization would thus be to jeopardize
67. See. e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 158 (1871) (remarks of Sen. Sherman) ("I
suppose any candid man in North Carolina would tell you it is impossible for the civil authorities,
however vigilant they may be, to punish those who perpetrate these outrages."); see also id. at 155
(describing thwarted attempts by officials to prosecute lawbreakers).
68. See, e.g., id. at 365-66 (remarks of Rep. Arthur) (bill should be defeated because unlike
earlier statutes it creates liability without regard to willfulness).
The Supreme Court has rejected "willfulness" as a requisite element of a § 1983 cause of action.
See supra note 45 and accompanying text; see also Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 180 (1961) (statute
passed to safeguard rights deprived "by reason of prejudice, passion, neglect, intolerance or other-
wise"). Monroe specifically distinguished 42 U.S.C. § 1983 from its criminal counterpart, 18 U.S.C. §
242, which provides a federal remedy for criminal behavior:
[In Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945),] we dealt with a statute that imposed criminal
penalties for acts "wilfully" done. We construed that word in its setting to mean the doing of
an act with "a specific intent to deprive a person of a federal right." We do not think that
gloss should be put on [§ 1983]. ... The word "wilfully" does not appear in [§ 19831....
[Section 1983) should be read against the background of tort liability that makes a man re-
sponsible for the natural consequences of his actions.
Id. at 187 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
69. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 448 (1871) (remarks of Rep. Butler) (state has
no constitutional or other right to deny or neglect to provide equal protection of the law); see also
Schnapper, supra note 9, at 242 (whether failure to secure protection of the laws was willful or the
result of inability made no difference; debates focused not on states' desire to violate equal protection
clause but on "indifference" and "neglect").
70. Evidence on how a department came to choose a training program or disciplinary procedure
would be in the hands of the defendant police officials themselves. Even if a plaintiff could obtain such
information, she would still face the nearly insurmountable task of establishing that an official knew
that misconduct would "inevitably" result from the program or deliberately ignored prior instances of
abuse.
As the Kibbe dissent noted, claims such as the plaintiff's that would prevail under a negligence or
gross negligence standard would face dismissal where proof of deliberate indifference were required.
City of Springfield v. Kibbe, 107 S. Ct. 1114, 1121 (1987) (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Courts that
have adopted the "inevitability" or deliberate indifference standard have repeatedly granted defend-
ants' motions to dismiss on the ground that plaintiffs could not provide evidence sufficient to meet the
intentionality demand. See, e.g., Carter v. District of Columbia, 795 F.2d 116 (D.C. Cir. 1986);
Patzner v. Burkett, 779 F.2d 1363 (8th Cir. 1985); Fecteau v. Unknown Officers of Clinton, 596 F.
Supp. 580 (E.D. Mich. 1984).
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municipal relief7" for one class of plaintiffs for whom the provision was
clearly designed. 2
III. AN ALTERNATIVE JUDICIAL APPROACH
The Supreme Court has undermined both Monell and section 1983 it-
self by threatening to require proof of intent or authorization before mu-
nicipal liability will attach. This trend should be rejected in favor of an
approach that neither amounts to respondeat superior liability nor imper-
missibly burdens the civil rights plaintiff. By using an objective standard
for evaluating program adequacy and a causation test consonant with the
policies justifying municipal liability under section 1983, courts can
achieve this result.
Where official conduct is at issue, the risk of injury may in some in-
stances be so unacceptably high that failure to take action constitutes an
abuse of power.73 Deficient preparatory or supervisory safeguards may
create just such a risk in a law enforcement setting, regardless of whether
they were chosen or maintained through deliberation or inertia.7 4
71. Sometimes, of course, plaintiffs will be able to succeed under the more restrictive standard by
either offering evidence of actual knowledge or deliberation or presenting facts so egregious that a trial
judge would deem the policymakers' behavior "deliberately indifferent" or "inevitably" resulting in
future abuse. For example, in Herrera v. Valentine, 653 F.2d 1220 (8th Cir. 1981), a Native Ameri-
can woman sued the local government after police kicked her in the abdomen though she was visibly
pregnant, threatened to shoot her, and then denied her medical care so that she lost her baby. Prior to
the incident, hearings had been held on the abusive treatment of Native Americans by local law
enforcement agents, but authorities did nothing to respond to the numerous complaints of brutality
that were made. The court found here that the city's failure to act resulted in the "inevitability" of an
incident such as plaintiff's and awarded her damages against the municipality. Id. at 1222-26; see
also Rymer v. Davis, 754 F.2d 198 (6th Cir.), vacated and remanded sub nom. City of Shep-
herdsville v. Rymer, 473 U.S. 901, affd sub nom. Rymer v. Davis, 775 F.2d 756 (6th Cir. 1985)
(suspect beaten, kicked, jailed, and deprived of medical care; circuit court, on remand after Tuttle,
found city's omissions met inevitability standard).
Yet limiting redress to only isolated, flagrant constitutional violations would allow a city to escape
liability in numerous cases in which it is at fault. As the Court remarked in Owen v. City of Indepen-
dence, 445 U.S. 622, 651 (1981), it would be "uniquely amiss" if the government itself-as the
protector of citizens' rights-were allowed to disavow liability for the injuries it generates. Indeed,
acceptance of a proof-of-intent requirement where inaction is alleged would have the effect of granting
municipalities a limited immunity, the outcome desired by the dissenters in Owen in 1980: Municipal-
ities could be shielded by their good intentions and be found liable only for the most egregious consti-
tutional violations. See id. at 666, 673-75, 679 (Powell, J., dissenting); see also City of St. Louis v.
Praprotnik, No. 86-772 (U.S. Mar. 2, 1988) (LEXIS, Genfed library, U.S. file) (Brennan, J., con-
curring) (Congress did not enact § 1983 simply to reach only those deprivations that are truly
"egregious.").
72. Indeed, many of the anecdotes related in § 1983's legislative history bear a compelling resem-
blance to the claims of brutality brought against police officials today. See, e.g., Blackmun, supra note
44, at 17-18 (quoting Shapo, Constitutional Tort: Monroe v. Pape, and the Frontiers Beyond, 60
Nw. U.L. REv. 277 (1965) (noting similarity between police misconduct alleged in Monroe and beat-
ings described in floor debate in 1871)).
73. See Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344, 353 n.2 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting); see also
Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622 (1981).
74. See supra notes 52-55 and accompanying text; see also W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra
note 14, § 31, at 170 ("Risk ... may ... be defined as a danger which is apparent, or should be
apparent, to one in the position of the actor.") (emphasis added); Mead, supra note 34, at 556
(inadequate supervision creates tremendous potential for unconstitutional behavior; municipality cre-
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Whether such inadequacies caused harm in a particular case should there-
fore be determined not by an inquiry into a policymaker's state of mind
but by objective criteria that juries are asked to evaluate.7"
The threshold issue in police misconduct litigation is determining when
training inadequacies or supervisory omissions can be considered "policy"
within the meaning of Monell.76 To prove the existence of a policy, plain-
tiffs should not have to show that the municipality's choice of training
program rendered brutality inevitable, or that a chief knew his or her
responses to misconduct would result in further harm. Rather, victims of
police abuse should have to prove that the department followed procedures
or practices that a reasonable administrator would have known would
lead to misconduct.77
In seeking to establish "policy," a plaintiff would first identify the de-
partmental program or practice allegedly responsible for the violation.7 1
The litigant would next show, perhaps through expert testimony or data
on customary police practice, that the procedure is inadequate (i.e., that it
creates a risk of harm of which a reasonable police administrator would
have been aware).79 The municipal defendant would then have the oppor-
ating such a risk should bear cost when risk becomes reality).
75. See W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 14, § 32, at 173-74 (standard of conduct, to be
applied by jury, must be external and objective, rather than based on individual judgment of particu-
lar actor).
76. The state-of-mind analysis conflates the two distinct strands of the Monell test: policy and
causation. See Comment, City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle: Causation in Municipal Liability Cases
Under Section 1983, 11 OKLA. CITY U.L. REv. 207, 212 (1986); see also supra notes 33-34 and
accompanying text.
77. The critical difference between this test and that sought by the Kibbe dissent and Tuttle plu-
rality is that it relies on objective rather than subjective foresight. Instead of examining the poli-
cymaker's actual state of mind, this approach presumes law enforcement authorities to be informed,
within reason, of the dangers of poor police practices and programs.
The Supreme Court implicitly recognized this distinction when it affirmed a judgment against the
city of Memphis in Brandon v. Holt, 469 U.S. 464 (1985). The suit involved an unprovoked stabbing
and shooting by an officer with a history of violence. The trial court held the department director
liable although he had no actual knowledge of the officer's dangerous propensities on the theory that
he should have known of them and was only shielded by deficient procedures. While the questions
before the Court concerned amendment of pleadings and official immunity, Justice Stevens' opinion
quoted at length from the district court's finding that the police administrator could not be absolved of
liability because he was insulated by departmental policies from knowledge of wrongdoing. Id. at 467
& n.6.
Other commentators have understood "policy" under Monell to include municipal conduct that
would foreseeably cause constitutional injury. See Friedman, Parratt v. Taylor: Opening and Closing
the Door on Section 1983, 9 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 545, 567 (1982) (§ 1983 applicable where
negligent acts create foreseeable risk to constitutional rights); Schnapper, supra note 9, at 234-35, 236
(policies entailing unreasonable risk of causing constitutional violation actionable); see also City of
Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 832 (1984) (Brennan, J., concurring) (§ 1983 available for
victim of policy or custom that would foreseeably and avoidably cause individual to be subjected to
deprivation of constitutional right).
78. These might include training in how and when to use a given weapon or tactic; restrictions on
the use of deadly force; preparation for encounters with potentially hostile suspects; measures for
coping with stressful or threatening situations; periodic inservice training for officers; follow up pro-
grams for new recruits; and procedures for handling complaints filed against officers.
79. See Berquist v. County of Cochise, 806 F.2d 1364 (9th Cir. 1986) (allegation that official
reasonably should have known that failure to act would cause others to inflict constitutional injury
stated claim); Anthony v. Baker, 767 F.2d 657 (10th Cir. 1985) (sheriff accountable if knew or rea-
sonably should have known of misconduct yet failed to prevent future harm).
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tunity to challenge plaintiff's claims with its own evidence. To determine
whether the plaintiff has proved an actionable policy, jurors might con-
sider the duration and intensity of a training program, the clarity of mu-
nicipal guidelines on the use of force, or the manner of implementation of
disciplinary procedures.80 If the jury finds that the program or posture
violates a reasonable standard of care, the plaintiff will have satisfied the
initial inquiry of the Monell test."1
The litigant who establishes "policy" under these criteria would then
have to prove that this policy caused her injury. To establish the link
between the municipal conduct and the harm, plaintiffs would not have to
show that municipal authorities deliberately ignored incidents of brutality
or "knew" that constitutional violations would result when they chose a
training program. The misconduct victim would instead prove that the
city's policy was a substantial factor8 2 in the causation of the tort. To that
end, a plaintiff might offer testimony from police experts showing that the
department's failure to discipline its officers was a substantial cause of the
beating she received or that proper training would have prevented unnec-
essary use of a firearm. In its defense, the city might argue that even
adequate preparation could not have anticipated the behavior of the de-
fendant officer in this case.83 The jury would then determine whether the
80. A plaintiff must be given the chance to conduct adequate discovery to establish her claim.
Critical information often will be in the hands of the opposing party, and the litigant's action should
not be dismissed before she has obtained access to the relevant data on training or the incidence of
brutality. See Owens v. Haas, 601 F.2d 1242, 1247 (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. County of
Nassau v. Owens, 444 U.S. 980 (1979).
81. Some might argue that this approach imposes an impermissible "affirmative duty" on local
governments to institute specific procedures to avoid liability or to take other affirmative action. A
reasonable foreseeability standard, however, does not require any action on the part of the municipal-
ity other than the exercise of due care under the circumstances. See W. PROSSER & W. KEETON,
supra note 14, § 34, at 209; Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 656 (1980) (officials must
consider whether their policies comport with constitutional mandates).
82. The "substantial factor" analysis is useful when more than one cause has contributed to an
event. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 14, § 41, at 267-68. In the police misconduct context,
both the individual officer's act and, if proved, the improper guidance he received might be considered
causes of the plaintiff's injury. This test acknowledges that the city is not the sole actor and holds it
accountable only where it can be shown to be largely responsible. This approach is also consistent
with the deterrence objectives of § 1983 in that it refuses to absolve the city from liability merely
because its conduct is not the unique cause of the harm. See Eaton, Causation in Constitutional
Torts, 67 IOwA L. REv. 443, 455-56 (1982) (substantial factor standard predicated on conviction that
wrongdoer should not be permitted to avoid consequences of wrongful conduct; provides incentive for
deterrence).
Even Justice O'Connor's dissent in City of Springfield v. Kibbe, 107 S. Ct. 1114 (1987), expressed
approval of the "substantial factor" test in determining causation. Id. at 1121 (O'Connor, J., dissent-
ing). Contrary to the dissent's assertion, however, a plaintiff could prove that the city's policy was a
substantial cause of the harm by, for example, relying on the testimony of experts in the field.
83. This method of handling claims would not lead to an assumption of municipal responsibility
whenever a patrolling officer committed a constitutional tort. City authorities could not be held ac-
countable where officers flouted sound procedures or committed unforeseeable violations. Further-
more, plaintiffs face a significant burden in proving that departmental procedures were a substantial
cause of their injuries.
Nor could this standard be said to lead to "overdeterrence" of the policing function: A department
that can show, despite plaintiff's evidence, that a particular policy is necessary to vigorous enforcement
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departmental "policy" was a legal cause of the constitutional violation. 4A
finding of causation would result in a determination of liability against
the municipality. The city would thus be held accountable only where its
own failure to train or discipline its police force was shown to have caused
harm.
This approach is consistent with Monell and the legislative purpose of
section 1983. It affirms the principle that municipalities must avoid com-
plicity in the illegal acts of law enforcement agents. Deterrence of govern-
mental abuse-a motivating force behind the passage of the civil rights
statute-will be encouraged if municipal officials are held liable where
their conduct is a substantial factor in creating harm. Courts will be re-
lieved of having to grope for an acceptable standard in seeking to avoid
respondeat superior liability. By relying on a reasonable foreseeability
test and considering causation separately under a "substantial factor"
analysis, courts can evaluate claims of a city's failure to train or discipline
adequately within the test established by Monell.
IV. CONCLUSION
The judicial trend toward requiring proof of municipal intent or af-
firmative authorization in section 1983 cases must be rejected. By de-
manding intent, the courts restrict a cause of action based on municipal
omissions, thus undermining both the viability of Monell and the legisla-
tive purpose of the civil rights statute. An intent requirement would pre-
clude recovery for most victims of police brutality who allege municipal
responsibility for their injuries, thereby reducing deterrence and incentives
for institutional improvement. Rather than require affirmative authoriza-
tion or intent, courts should employ a standard of reasonable foreseeability
of harm in assessing municipal responsibility. If a municipal policy of
neglect has allowed a citizen to be abused by the police, the victim will
then be able to seek the relief that section 1983 was enacted to provide.
of the law will have established its reasonableness. See Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 9-11 (1984)
(in determining reasonableness of fleeing felon law, Court weighed state's interest in effective law
enforcement against potential harm to citizens' rights).
84. See Rittenmeyer, supra note 52, at 263 (showing that deprivation resulted from natural and
foreseeable consequence of supervisory inaction establishes causal link); see also Eaton, supra note 82,
at 479-80. Plaintiffs often rely on expert testimony to establish the causal link between the city's
failures and the officer's conduct. See, e.g., City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 830-33
(1985) (Brennan, J., concurring). Police experts may show that an officer's training left her ill-
equipped to master a dangerous situation and therefore constituted the "moving force" of the injury to
the plaintiff. If a jury finds the expert's evidence credible, plaintiff will have established the very
causal connection that the Kibbe dissenters consider "tenuous." See supra notes 22-24 and accompa-
nying text.
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